The Case for Apportioning Electoral Votes by Congressional District
If you are anything like me, you are still buzzing from taking all the White Pills from Election Day and chasing them with cold Yuenglings, occasionally clanging and chugging them like Stone Cold when pundits made the call for key states like Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
Yuengling chumps Pete Coors’s pedestrian piss water any day of the week
Yet as Axl Rose articulated in the 80s, we must self-assess and ask, “Where do we go now, Sweet Shitlord O’ Mine?” This post will be the first of what I hope to be a multi-part series of a long-term strategic vision of the Trump Administration and the role we will play in shaping his agenda. I wish to devote this installment to arguing the necessity of expanding the Congressional District Method of apportioning electoral votes, an idea which Jazzhands has spoken about both on Twitter and in the post-election Live Daily Shoah.
As you no doubt learned by now, apportioning the electoral college by congressional district is already done in Nebraska and Maine. The principle is simple in that the candidate who wins the popular vote in each congressional district wins one electoral vote, while the winner of the statewide popular vote gets the additional two electoral votes (representing the state’s United States Senators). It appears to have been done by statute in Nebraska since ’96 and Maine since ’72, while a handful of other states have experimented with it over the years. In both Nebraska and Maine, the congressional district method was apparently accomplished by statute. While useful for our purposes, I will explain below why state constitutional amendments would be a preferred method of enacting the concept on a broader strategic level. First, I will present you with some arguments to use to explain why the congressional district method should even be adopted.
It is a logical extension of what the Framers of the Constitution, particularly Madison and Hamilton, discussed in The Federalist Papers when they explained the need to protect against factions and the tyranny of the majority. This argument is useful against those advocating for a switch to the popular vote. While abstract, when you use it in some real-world situations of the Left’s cultural Marxism, it becomes more powerful. Do the Leftists remember what happened with issues like gay marriage when left to the popular vote of the masses? When brought up to the legislatures of public referendum, gay marriage was routinely shot down for decades and took federal court intervention to ultimately become the law of the land. Do you seek to do an end-run around the Constitution by changing the way we elect our President and trample the will of a plurality? You are no better than any of the bigots and homophobes who wished to trample gay and trannie rights.
Besides which, Hill Shills still are not the majority. They are only a large plurality. While Hillary is winning the popular vote by 400k or so at time of this writing, she also does not look poised to take 50% of the popular vote, since Gary Johnson earned about 3% and Jill Stein earned about 1%. If these ratios hold, and unless there are an overwhelming number of uncounted votes for Secretary Clinton, they will, she will end up with greater than 49% but less than 50% of the popular vote. Now, the liberals are in a position where they must tell you why a minority of the voters should hold undue sway via a method that currently violates our Constitution.
On a more practical level than resorting to constitutional legal arguments, a congressional apportionment method forces candidates to run a truly national campaign. They will be induced to visit every state, or at least more of them, and not just pay lip service to their needs. Consider when looking at the schedules of President-Elect Trump, Secretary Clinton, and their surrogates, unless you were in Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Iowa, Nevada, Colorado, or ultimately Virginia and a handful of Rust Belt states in the final weekend, there was no incentive for any of them to present an argument to your state and its constituents. Heck, how much did either candidate campaign in their “home state” of New York? Just because a state is electorally a foregone conclusion, it does not mean that the candidates should be able to ignore them or their constituents.
Having discussed some of the logic for transitioning to the congressional district method, I remind the reader that historically it has been accomplished by statute. The difficulty of this method is that legislatures change over time and successful efforts to move to the congressional district method would require lobbying state houses, state senates, and the stage governor so that it would survive his veto. Therefore, I will now demonstrate why state constitutional amendments would be the preferred method.
For starters, state constitutional amendments are historically both more cumbersome to enact and more difficult to repeal. However, they supersede any state legislation that an enacting legislature may use to attempt to reverse an amendment down the line. Meaning that once accomplished, it would become theoretically more difficult to remove the congressional district method from a jurisdiction, since it would require not only an additional amendment to repeal, but also a willing and well-funded citizenry or amenable legislature to do so.
Next, such state constitutional amendments would be in no danger of violating the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Under the supremacy clause, any state statute or constitutional principle which conflicts with federal statute or the United States Constitution would be deemed unconstitutional. We have already established that the United States Constitution provides for the electoral college, and no federal statute currently exists which could conflict with the congressional district method. Similarly, while the Constitution authorizes the electoral college, it is silent as to whether statewide majority vote or the congressional district method are preferred or even the only manner to do so, which is why Nebraska and Maine constitutionally have done so. If, on the other hand, the United States Congress drafted such a statute declaring that state majority is the only way to apportion electoral votes, it would create a federal question as to whether said statute were even constitutional to begin with much less whether it would displace the state constitutions in states that have adopted the congressional district method. Additionally, it would create a more distinct question of federalism and states’s rights, as it would be a statute conflicting directly with a state constitution. Therefore, it is essential to begin to enact this strategy while we control the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Presidency, the latter of which recommend and confirm the federal judiciary and Supreme Court, all of which would be theoretically sympathetic to the congressional district method.
In the next installment of this series, I will look at several states or case studies, and explain to the reader the methods for state constitutional amendment within those jurisdictions and how to deploy our resources and how to accomplish the task.